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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work m the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The objectives of this study, approved July 1993, are to 
investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. This 
report details the findings of the first three years of the research effort and outlines the path 
forward. 
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year 
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflect the highway needs of the 
state. The General Assembly approves those projects that will be funded in the coming 
biennium. Reasonable cost forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that 
funding is available and projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule. 
KRS45.245, effective 1 July, 1992, grants the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation 
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project--
design, right-of-way, utility relocation, or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in 
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. Estimates developed using current methods 
have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. To date 
(7/1/92- 7/1/96), 362 overruns totaling over $162 million, have been submitted to the IJCT--
all have been approved for additional funding.* No concerted effort was made to track the 
number of cost underruns. 
Estimates for highway projects are usually the responsibility of the 12 District Highway 
Offices, which have few resources allotted to estimating. Furthermore, initial estimates, based 
on very little information, don't statistically support a ±15% confidence level. In light of the 
high variability of estimates based on little information and the lack of resources dedicated to 
estimating, a reasonable approach is to base estimates on actual costs of past projects. For the 
* Six additional overruns for the 1994 biennium were processed after this report was prepared. 
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conceptual estimate, the one used for initial authorization of a project, a cost-per-mile figure 
based on similar past projects can be used. After the design is completed on a new project, 
estimates for the remaining phases--right-of-way, utility relocation, and construction--can be 
updated to reflect design decisions such as route, grade and drain, etc. 
A cost-per-mile model, KYEstimate, has been developed to assist estimators in making 
conceptual estimates based on databases of preconstruction and construction project costs for 
the past five years. 
Emphasis for Year 4 of this study will be to enlarge the preconstruction and construction 
databases, refine KYEstimate, and develop and implement a training plan for the use of the 
model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need has been recognized by the Kentucky Transportation 
Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway Administration (FHW A). 
A research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHW A, starting in July 1993, to study 
current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. The project 
timetable specifies the following annual goals: 
• Year 1 (7/93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary 
recommendations for potential improvement areas. 
• Year 2 (7 /94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to improve the 
estimating process. 
• Year 3 (7 /95-6/96) - Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use. 
• Year 4 (7 /96-6/97) - Collect additional cost data, refine KYEstimate and train K yTC 
personnel in its use. 
• Year 5 (7/97-6/98)- Collect additional cost data and refine KYEstimate. 
The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work comes from a law enacted 
during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July 1, 1992, mandates 
that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-way, utility 
relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium highway plan 
(2YP) by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's Interim 
Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT must 
include written certification from the State Highway Engineer that .the overrun was caused by 
unanticipated circumstances, and provide specific details on the reasons for the cost overrun. 
The IJCT determines if the proposed additional money is reasonable and necessary, and also, 
if any alteration made or planned since its consideration by the General Assembly materially 
changed the project. 
This, the third interim report, discusses the findings of the first three years of the project: 
• Summary of First Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the first 
interim report, March 1994. 
• Summary of Second Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the 
second interim report, July 1995. 
• Estimates During the Period of Study - presents an analysis of the cost. overruns > 15% 
during the research period. 
• Cost-per-mile Model - presents a computer model, KYEstimate, that sorts data from the 
preconstruction and construction databases to assist an estimator in making an estimate 
based on past performance. 
• Conclusions - reports conclusions based on research findings to date. 
• Preliminary Recommendations - makes recommendations based on the research effort to 
date. 
• Path Forward- work to be accomplished during the fourth year of the research. 
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SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S FINDINGS 
The section provides a summary of the status of the research effort when the first interim 
report was issued in March 1994. The statements used reflect conditions at that time and may 
be updated later in this report to reflect current conditions. 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to 
either the K yTC or the Legislature. The reason seems to be not so much that the cost 
forecasting ability of the KyTC has declined of late, but that the Legislature has voted itself 
more oversight of the 2YP execution. The reporting requirements of the oversight law, 
KRS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway 
department. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is required, are in some cases impossible 
to meet, and in other cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not 
performing current duties. 
The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem; 
solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is 
not feasible. There are three ways to mitigate the problem of poor cost forecasting. The first 
is for the Legislature to either forego the oversight or to modif'y it so the K yTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels, the second is for the K yTC to change how the 6YP 
and the 2YP are developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve 
its estimating ability. All of these options have financial and political implications. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted in 134 overruns worth over $69 million being 
presented to the IJCT for review during the current biennium to date (7/1/92 - 2/13/94). All 
of these overruns were approved. The IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns, which would provide as much evidence of poor cost forecasting as overruns do. 
The oversight seems to be used not so much to improve KyTC's cost forecasting ability as it 
is to make a political statement about who is in charge of getting highways constructed in the 
Commonwealth. If this is indeed the case, and if blanket approval of all overruns is assured, 
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then perhaps a continuation of the status quo is acceptable. However, currently the KyTC is 
trying to appease the IJCT by increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to report 
phase overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP and 2YP 
impossible, and has the potential of causing the loss of federal funds if and when there aren't 
enough projects in the 6YP ready to be advanced into the 2YP to utilize approved federal aid. 
The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modifY it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the 
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem 
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate 
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by 
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT by 
report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only those 
overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be examined, not those that will be summarily 
approved. 
The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change 
would be to complete either an in-depth scoping study and/or preliminary design prior to 
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization 
of the 6YP be funded by state funds. 
The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require 
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's 
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right-of-
way and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estimating. Also, demands for on-the-
spot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed 
project prior to submitting the initial estimate. 
The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other 
states. The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the 
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legislative oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of the 
highway plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many states 
are better staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable amount of 
preliminary design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan. 
Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to 
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the current estimating and cost forecasting 
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are: how to better use 
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating 
procedures. 
Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them 
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating 
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later tum out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting ability 
and to the relationship between the K yTC and the Legislature. In order to seize this 
opportunity, both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political 
and fiscal realities. 
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SUMMARY OF SECOND YEAR'S FINDINGS 
The second interim report, issued in July 1995, is summarized in this section. Statements 
used in this section of the report reflect conditions at that particular time, and may be 
changed later to represent current conditions. 
Research continues to show that the Legislature must either forego the oversight or 
modify it so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels, the KyTC 
must change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed, and/or the KyTC must increase its 
staff to improve the estimates. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted in 263 overruns worth over $116 million 
being presented to the UCT since the law became effective (7/1/92- 7/1/95). All of these 
overruns were approved. The IJCT continued to make no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns. 
Revelant cost data for both preconstruction and construction phases were collected to 
provide estimators with cost from past projects. These projects were stored in a manner 
that efficiently allowed estimators to select data useful to their current project. 
Projects in both databases were defined by twelve key attributes: 
1 District 
2 Item# 
3 County 
4 Type of work 
5 Functional classification 
6 Number of lanes 
7 Length 
8 Percent bridge length 
9 Number of bridges or major culverts 
10 Award year 
11 Route Name 
12 TD-10 Number 
District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12 
Item # - district identifier number 
County - county or counties; by name 
Type of work- FHW A Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix) 
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Functional classification - KyTC classification system (see appendix) 
Number of lanes - number oflanes involved 
Length - length in miles to three decimal points 
Percent bridge length - [bridge length/project length] 
Number of bridges- total number of bridges (or culverts> $50,000) in project 
Award year- calendar year project was awarded for construction 
Route Name- number of road: US60, KY109, etc. 
TD-1 0 Number- number on the Project Authorization Form 
Along with the above attributes was the cost of each preconstruction phase or 
construction phase and the fiscal year of the project. The search for data was limited to 
the last four years because of missing data related to the twelve attributes. Key 
characteristics were missing from many of the projects, precluding their inclusion in the 
databases. 
The cost per mile model, KYEstimate, was written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0 and designed 
to aid in the estimating process. The program would allow estimators to access the 
databases and select past projects that were similar to a project they wanted to estimate. 
The program used the length of the project and total cost to calculate the unit cost of the 
project. The estimators could then use the historical data or enter their own estimate 
based upon their past experience. A summary sheet of all pertinent information about the 
estimate could be printed and/or saved for later reference. The model was still under 
development. 
A model was also under development using a cost per parcel concept for the right-of-way 
phase. This program was also developed in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0. The database was 
defined by attributes such as: parcel number, owner's name, parcel type, cost of parcel, 
area of parcel, building purchase, and litigation. The model and data seemed to be 
insufficient for determining an accurate cost per parcel. There was an extremely high 
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variation in values for similar projects, and as a result, this method for developing a 
conceptual estimate for the right-of-way phase was abandoned. 
A questionnaire was sent to the twelve district highway offices asking about the current 
process for developing conceptual estimates; seventy percent were returned. Responses 
showed that although most estimators were comfortable with their conceptual estimates, 
they were not sure what constituted a good conceptual estimate because of lack of 
feedback. 
Performance measurements that were being investigated included: 
Actual cost of project phases vs. Estimated cost of project phases 
Number of projects let vs. Number of projects planned to let 
Actual Revenues vs. Estimated Revenues 
Number of projects negotiated vs. Number of projects litigated 
Amount of money received from federal turnovers at end of the federal FY 
Standard Deviation of: [[A- E]/A]*lOO for each year 
Number of project overruns 
Number of project underruns 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory 
to either the K yTC or the Legislature. The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and 
causes much wasted effort by KyTC personnel. It would be more effective to use 
different thresholds for different phases. Another alternative would be to update estimates 
once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is determined. An 
improvement to the current process would be to require that only overruns over a certain 
amount be formally presented to the IJCT and others require only a paper notification. 
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ESTIMATES DURING THE PERIOD OF STUDY 
Estimates developed using current methods have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude 
cost overruns in excess of 15%. Since the law became effective, (7/1/92 - 7/1/96), 362 
overruns, totaling $162,487,511 have been submitted to the IJCT. * All have been approved 
for additional funding. 
The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past coptes of the 
Notification to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning 
Project Phase Cost Overruns > 15%. This document, an overrun summary, is submitted by 
the KyTC to the IJCT for a phase overrun >15% and is identified by a tracking number. 
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences, by phase. Figure 3 shows 
a breakdown of overrun costs, by phase. 
Figure 1 - Overrun Occurrences by Phase 
Design 
4% 
Figure 2 - Overrun Costs by Phase 
* Six additional overruns for the 1994 biennium were processed after this report was prepared. 
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Table 1 shows the cost and frequency breakdown, by phase, of the 362 overruns to date. 
Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase and the number of occurrences of 
each. Because some overruns have more than one cause listed, the total number of cause 
occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a phase. Entries in the 
column, Contributing Track Numbers, refer to the specific documents where a cause is 
used as justification for an overrun. A brief synopsis of the impact of the overruns in each 
phase is also provided. For comparison, the figures from the 1992 biennium are found in 
brackets beside the updated figures. 
Table 1: Breakdown of Highway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase. 
Phase Number of % Occurring • Total Cost of %Cost 
Occurrences Phase Overruns ** 
Design 47 [20] 13.0 [11.0] $6,946,919 4.3 
[$1,900,000] [2.3] 
Right -of-way 88 [43] 24.3 [23.6] $22,575,500 13.9 
[$9,220,500] [11.2] 
Utility Relocation 90 [54] 24.9 [29.7] $27,963,568 17.2 
[$18,781,000] [22.9] 
Construction 137 [65] 37.8 [35.7] $105,001,524 64.6 
[$52, 148,035] [63.6] 
Totals= 362 [182] 100.0 $162,487,511 100.0 
[$82,049,535] 
* percent of the 3 62 overruns that occurred in each phase 
**percent of the total cost of the 362 overruns ($162,487,511) attributable to phase 
Design Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the design phase accounted for 13.0% of the total number and 4.3% of the total 
cost of all overruns: forty-seven (47) overruns @ $6,946,919. Table 2 shows that 
underestimation of the complexity of the project, underestimation because consultant fees 
were higher than the estimated in-house design costs, and scope changes due to worse than 
expected site conditions were the three primary causes for design phase overruns. These 
causes accounted for 61.1% of all design phase overruns, slightly lower than the 65.0% from 
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the previous biennium. Three justifications were used during the 1994 biennium only; 
underestimation of cost of bridge inspection effort, part of design inadvertently omitted, and 
additional administration costs accounted for 13.1% of the design overruns in the 1994 
biennium. While there were 20 causes for design phase overruns in the 1992 biennium, there 
were 34 in the 1994 biennium, an increase of 70%. Over the last biennium, the number of 
overruns occurring and the cost attributed to the design phase has risen 2. 0%. 
Table 2: Breakdown of Design Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Design Design Phase 
Phase Overruns Overruns). 
underestimation of complexity of project 16 [4) 29.6 [20.0) 12, 14,53,54,55,59, 
necessitating further design effort over 65, 71,79, 121,146, 
what was originally envisioned 152 [5,88,89,143) 
underestimation because consultant fees 9 [6) 16.7 [30.0) 71,77,79 
were higher than the estimated in-house [98,99,106,128, 
design costs 139,140] 
scope changes due to site conditions being 8 [3) 14.8 [15.0) 48,164,169,172,173 
worse than expected [53,96,109] 
initial estimate based on preliminary plans, 6 [2) 11.1 [10.0] 49,159,163,169 
maps, and data [25,37) 
original estimate doesn't account for in- 4 [3) 7.4 [15.0] 172 [144,145,146) 
house evaluation of routine design project 
outlays and metric units 
underestimation of cost of bridge 3 [OJ 5.6 [0.0] 25,42,43 
inspection effort 
part of design inadvertently omitted 3[0) 5.6 [0.0] 111,121,172 
scope changes due to local and public 2 [1) 3.7 [5.0) 79 [67] 
pressure & involvement 
shift in alignment necessitating a greater 2 (I] 3. 7 [5.0] 174 [2) 
design effort than what was initially 
estimated 
additional administration costs 1(0] 1.9 [0.0] 77 
Totals= 54 [20) 100 
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Right-of-way Overruns 
Overruns in the right-of-way phase accounted for 24.3% of the total number and 13.9% of the 
total cost of all overruns: eighty-eight (88) overruns @ $22,575,500. Table 3 shows that the 
leading causes for right-of-way overruns in the 1992 biennium were changes in project scope 
made during the design phase and after the initial estimate was made. The leading cause in the 
1994 biennium was that the estimate was made with very preliminary plans, maps, and data. 
Both of these causes together total 59.7% of the right-of-way overruns, as compared to the 
last biennium, 70.3% Scope changes in design arose for a variety of reasons. Oftentimes, 
changes were made to provide an improved facility over what was originally envisioned. At 
other times, design calculations (i.e., hydraulic analysis, sight distance requirements, traffic 
impact studies, etc.) led to changes involving different right-of-way parcels demands. These 
design changes included shifts in roadway alignment, widening of the proposed roadway and 
lengthening of bridges and approaches. New justifications to the 1994 biennium were 
acquisition of utility easements and settling of right-of-way parcels to speed up the process. 
Causes of right-of-way overruns in the 1992 biennium numbered 54, as compared to 114 in 
the 1994 biennium. That is an 111% increase in causes. The percent occurring of right-of-
way overruns has increased by 0.7 and the percent cost of the overruns has increased by 2.7. 
Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All ROW Numbers 
Causes for ROW Phase Overruns) 
Phase Overruns 
initial estimate made with very 36 [18] 31.6 [33.3] 8,26,41 ,50,56,57 ,58,61' 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 89,91,92,93,94,96, 103, 
data: estimate updated based on more 118,135,138 
design detail [3,6, 7 ,9,10,16,40,59,69, 
71,102,105,117,124,130, 
152,154,159] 
changes in project scope as a result of 32 [20] 28.1 [37.0] 10, 11,16,21,23,39,51,52, 
decisions made in design 58,62,89,116 
[3,24,51,55,62,63, 70, 
71,76,83,86,95,108,117, 
118,127,139,140,141, 
!58] 
(contmued on next page) 
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Table 3: Breakdown of Ril!ht-of-way Phase Overruns. (continued) 
unusually high jury award 12 [!] 10.5 [1.9] 58,88,90,102,116, 
118,139, !53, !54, !60,161 
[132] 
land values increased in vicinity of 9 [2] 7.9 [3.7] 10,56,85,93,112,138,144 
proposed right-of-way [16, 1581 
changes in project scope as a result of 8 [3] 7.0 [5.6] 38,57,61,93,132 
worse than expected site conditions [38,59,136] 
inadvertent omission 6 [5] 5.3 [9.3] 50 [1,58,70,76,158] 
improvement made to right -of-way after 6 [2] 5.3 [3.7] 57,123,145,!58 [72,133] 
initial estimate was made 
new or modified legislation enacted after 3 [3] 2.6 [5.6] [16,51,64] 
initial estimate made 
acquisition of utility easements (usually 1 [0] 0.9 [0.0] !0 
part of the utility phase) 
settling of ROW parcel to speed up 1 [0] 0.9 [0.0] 24 
process 
Totals= 114 [54] 100 
Utility Relocation Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the utility relocation phase have decreased (unlike any other phase) since the 1992 
biennium. They currently accounting for 24.9% of the total number and 17.2% of the total 
cost of all overruns: ninety (90) overruns @ $27,963,568. Table 4 shows that the most 
frequent cause for utility relocation overruns, like that for the right-of-way phase, came from 
the initial estimate being made with very preliminary plans, maps and generalized data. 
Similarly, the second leading cause for utility relocation phase overruns was due to changes 
made in the project scope during the design phase. Combined, these two causes account for 
57.3% of all the utility relocation phase overruns, somewhat less than the 70% last biennium. 
The cause of overruns in the utility phase has decreased by almost 26% since the 1992 
biennium, going from 70 causes to just 52. The number of utility overruns occurring and the 
cost attributed to them have both dropped by about 5%. 
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Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Utility Utility 
relocation Phase Relocation 
Overruns Phase 
Overruns). 
initiaJ estimate made with very 37 [22] 30.3 [31.4] 6,9,41,57,61,64,83,84,89, 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 91,97,134,136,140,155 
data. Estimate updated based on more [3,6,7,9,22,23,36,39,60,68, 
design detail 69,71,82,95,102,105,117. 
124,133,152,153,154] 
changes in project scope as a result of 33 [27] 27.0 [38.6] 13,18,21,31,32,89 
decisions made in design [3 ,4,50,51,52,55,62, 71,7 5, 
77,86,87,90,95,103,104, 
117,119,120,122,123,127, 
131,134,137,141,159] 
increase in relocation costs over what was 21 [6] 17.2 [8.6] 1,2,13,17,31,57 ,63, 72,95, 
expected 96,97,117,133,155,162 
[48,49,51,62,120,129] 
changes in scope due to worse than 11 [3] 9.0 [4.3] 13,22,38,61, 72,110,122, 
expected site conditions 133 [38,71,82] 
inadvertent omission 10 [8] 8.2 [11.4] 31,119 
[8,11,49,52,82,91,135,159] 
underestimation of state force 7 [2] 5.7 [2.9] 31,72,110,117,133 
involvement cost [120,129] 
new installation in proposed ROW after 3 [2] 2.5 [2.9] 1 [48,120] 
estimate made 
Totals= 122 [70] 100 
Construction Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 3 7. 8% of the total number and 64.6% of the 
total cost of all overruns >15%: one hundred thirty-seven (137) overruns@ $105,001,524. 
The majority of overruns to date still occur in the construction phase. In addition, the 
construction phase still comprises the largest percentage of the total overrun cost. Table 5 
shows that the three leading causes for construction overruns were higher than expected unit 
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bid prices and/or individual work item costs, changes in project scope as a result of changes 
made in the design phase, and changes in scope due to worse than expected site conditions. 
These three causes made up nearly two-thirds of the construction overruns at 63.5%. Higher 
than expected unit bid prices and/or individual work item costs saw one of the biggest 
increases over the two bienniums with about 125%. Two justifications, change in KyTC 
policy for contingency percent add-on and poor initial estimate, were new to the 1994 · 
biennium. The 1992 biennium had a total of 94 causes attributing to construction cost 
overruns, while the 1994 biennium had 14 7. That's a 56% increase in causes. The overall 
occurrence of construction overruns and total cost of those overruns had both increased by 
2.1% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Construction 
Construction Phase Phase 
Overruns Overruns). 
ltigher than expected unit bid prices 75 [23] 31.1 [24.5] 3, 4, 7, 19,20,28,29 ,30,3 3 ,35, 
and/or individual work item costs 36,37,44,46,47,60,66,67,68, 
75,76,81,82,86,98,99,100, 
105,106,107,108,109,113, 
114,115,120,124,125,126, 
127,129,130,131,142,148, 
149,151,156,157,165,166, 
167[12, 15, 19,20,21,26,28, 
34,35,42,43,44,46,47,54,56, 
57,66, 79,142,147,151, 157] 
changes in project scope as a result of 44 [30] 18.3 [31.9] 5, 7, 15,33,45,66,69, 100,113, 
decisions made in design 130,141,143,170,171 
[13,18,21,26,30,31,34,35, 
41,46,54,56,61,66,74,79, 
80,101,107,110,111,112, 
125,126,147,148, 149, !50, 
151,155] 
changes in scope due to worse than 34 [20] 14.1 [21.3] 20,27,46,47 ,70,75,82, 114, 
expected site conditions 124,148,149, !50, 151, !56 
[ 14,17,27 ,32,33,65,73, 74, 
78,82,84,85,92,94,97, 112, 
113,142,151, 156] 
( contmued on next page) 
15 
Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. (continued) 
inadvertent omission 18 [6] 7.5 [6.4] 19,45,69, 100,105,106,131, 
137,150,151,156,168 
[19,42,43,85, 93, 10 I] 
utility work done in construction phase 16 [5] 6.6 [5.3] 3,5, 7,34,60,66,76,81, 113, 
156,168 
[45,116, 126,150, !57] 
initial estimate made with very 16 [4] 6.6 [4.3] 46,4 7 ,80,81, 109,114,127, 
preliminary plans, maps, and 128,129,142,143,167 
generalized data: estimate updated [15,29,57,81] 
based on more design detail 
change in KyTC policy for contingency 13 [0] 5.4 [0.0] 30,35,36, 45,46,4 7,67 ,68,86, 
percent add-on 148,149,!50,151 
addition of work materials to make 7 [I] 2.9 [1.1] 27,40, 113,131,147, IS I 
safe facility realized during the [138] 
construction phase 
complexity of construction 6 [2] 2.5 [2.1] 4,67,81, 86 [21,157] 
underestimated 
poor initial estimate 5 [0] 2.1 [0.0] 98,101,107,142,168 
bonuses for minimal traffic impact 3 [I] 1.2 [1.1] 124,156 [85] 
given 
higher than expected inspection costs 2 [I] 0.8 [1.1] 114 [97] 
two separate construction phases 2 [I] 0.8 [1.1] 80 [100] 
combined to minimize overall cost to 
state 
Totals= 241 [94] 100 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Tables 1-5. 
• While design phase overruns account for 13.0% of all overruns, they only account for 
4.3% of the total cost reported. Design phase overruns are not a major problem. 
• Based on the 362 overruns to date, the following would likely have occurred if estimates 
had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the design phase was completed: 
• 59.7% of the right-of-way overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
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" 57.3% of the utility relocation phase overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• 24.9% of construction overrun causes would potentially have been eliminated. 
• Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed 
14.8% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 7.0% for right-of-way overruns, 
9. 0% for utility relocation overruns, and 14.1% for construction overruns. Increased site 
investigation by designers and estimators might have reduced these overruns, however, 
some soil conditions and contamination will always present problems. 
• Construction phase overruns accounted for nearly 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns. It 
was stated that 24.9% of construction overrun cause occurrence could potentially be 
eliminated if estimates were made after design was complete. An additional 31.1% of 
overrun cause occurrences could be reduced if accurate unit bid price data were used. 
• Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing of numbers, or 
switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated 
periodically. 
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COST-PER-MILE MODEL 
The Cost-per-mile Model is a computer based program, written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0, 
that: 
a) allows an estimator to access the preconstruction and construction databases through 
DBASE IV software and Microsoft QUERY, 
b) allows an estimator to select a set of past projects that are similar to the new project, 
c) processes the data related to the set of past projects producing an estimate based on 
historical data, 
d) allows an estimator to either accept the estimate based mi. historical data or to enter a 
new estimate, 
e) allows an estimator to specify metric or English units and an inflation factor for the 
new project, 
f) provides statistical information about the predicted accuracy of the new estimate 
based on past projects, and 
g) produces a Summary Sheet with the new estimate and important information about 
what the model predicts. 
The model, called KYEstimate, is very user-friendly. A copy of the program, with a 
user's manual, was distributed to all of the twelve highway districts in December of 1995 
and January of 1996. After allowing the estimators a few weeks to experiment with the 
model, researchers went to each of the districts to answer any questions and get feedback 
on the program. 
Reception to the program varied across the state. While some estimators seemed pleased 
to finally get some help with their conceptual estimates, other were not very receptive to 
the program. Some had not even opened the software. The number one complaint of the 
estimators was the size of the database. Many districts only had 15 to 20 projects and 
therefore could not get a reasonable estimate. 
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Estimators were also asked what parts of the program were most beneficial to them, or if 
there were unnecessary components within the program. Many suggested that the work 
type list was too defined, giving many maintenance projects that just would not be used. 
Others suggested the program be made to perform in metric and an inflation factor be 
applied to the estimate. Each highway district was left with a copy of their district's 
projects and asked to make any corrections they felt were needed. ·Only five of the twelve 
districts returned any information on their data. 
After the visit with the districts, several changes were made to the model. Most were only 
cosmetic changes. Some of the data was moved around to make it easier for the 
estimators to find. Item number became the primary identifier rather than TD-10 number. 
Some classifications in the database were deleted because they were not valuable to the 
estimators. 
Perhaps one of the biggest changes involved the database. In order to make changes to 
the databases, they were changed to DBASE IV files. Upon opening the program, the 
database (either preconstruction or construction depending on what the user specifies) 
would be pulled into the program using Microsoft QUERY. This protects the database 
from being changed within the program, but allows someone to update the DBASE IV file 
and send it to the districts. 
Since the last interim report, the size of the construction database has increased by several 
hundred projects. The preconstruction database is currently the same size, but projects 
will soon be added to it also. With this increase in projects, the model has become more 
valuable, using a much larger database to predict unit costs. Estimators may throw out 
projects with extremely high or low costs and still be left with plenty of projects to use for 
their estimate. 
. 
A metric option was added to the program. The database is in English units, but once in 
KYEstimate, it may be changed to metric. An inflation factor, default of 3%, is used on 
the estimates. 
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Projects in the database could be selected by nine key attributes: 
1 District 
2 Construction Fiscal Year 
3 Construction Type 
4 Route 
5 WorkType 
6 Number of Lanes 
7 Functional Class 
8 Length 
9 Lane Width 
District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12 
Construction Fiscal Year - year the construction phase took place 
Construction Type - types of work done in construction phase (see appendix) 
Route- number of road: 60, 109, etc. 
Work Type- FHW A Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix) 
Number oflanes - number oflanes involved 
Functional classification - KyTC classification system (see appendix) 
Length - length in miles to three decimal points 
Lane Width - the width of the particular route 
EXAMPLE 
A new estimate is needed for the construction phase of a 2-lane rural resurfacing project in 
Clark County. The road length is three miles and includes shoulder improvements. 
All information relevant to the estimate is provided on the Estimate Summary Sheet screen 
shown in Figure 3. 
After entering the information identifying the project, etc. (Estimate Identification, Figure 
3), the estimator moves to the construction database and selects criteria to use in the 
search for completed projects similar to the new project. The criteria are set by selecting 
combinations of items under each of the headings in Table 3. These items may be 
combined by using logical queries. In the case of text, the queries may be AND, OR, =, 
etc. In the case of numbers, the queries may be =, >=, etc. A new system allows the user 
to type in his/her selection and click the "Filter" button. 
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DIST 
CONST_FY 
CON_TYPE 
ROUTE 
'NORK TYPE 
# LNSI 
FCLASS I 
LENGTH 
LN_WUTH 
THIS ESTIMATE GENERATED 8Y KYESTIMATE 
PRO..JECT 10 # 
ROAD NAME 
DISTRICT 
ESTIMATOR 
UNITS(ENG/METRICJ 
DATE OF ESTIMATE 
DESIGN 
DESIGN 
ROW 
MILES 
ROW 
UTI LilY 
UTI LilY 
CONSTR 
43,62:6 
15,612 
75,552: 
2:3,164 
II 
Figure 3 - Estimate Summary Sheet 
\ KYEstimate I ...... 
lOTAL 
43,826 
15,61 2: 
75,552 
23,164 
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In this case, after trying various combinations, the estimator selects the following: 
Construction database, District 1 , Construction Type H, Work Type 72, ~ lanes, and rural 
roads. The search of the construction database using these criteria finds the projects data 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Database Search Results 
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7 $26,391 
7 994 $35,208 
7 991 $35,345 
7 991 $32,976 $37,115 
7 992 $39,410 $43,064 
7 12 994 $42.447 $43.720 
7 10 993 $44,038 $46,720 
7 9 993 $47,797 $50,707 
7 10 993 $61,358 $65,095 
7 I I 994 $73,352 $75,552 
7 12 992 $96,843 $105,824 
7 940637 10 994 $129,21 I $133,087 
The cost-per-mile of the selected past projects is calculated and presented on the screen 
(Statistical Analysis, Figure 3). 
The estimator can use the estimates for each phase determined by the means of the actual 
costs of past projects in the selected set or enter a new estimate. If a new estimate is 
entered, statistical information about the probability of the estimate's accuracy based on 
past data is presented (User Estimate, Figure 3). The estimate to be used in the six-year 
plan is shown (6 YP Estimate, Figure 3). The estimator then records the criteria used for 
the set of projects used in the trial estimate (Search Criteria, Figure 3). Also, any 
justification for the new estimate being higher or lower than the historical data would 
predict is recorded (Estimate Justification, Figure 3). 
The model, while simple in concept, is actually quite complex. 
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An experienced estimator would likely make a better estimate than would KYEstimate. 
However, an experienced estimator is not always available, and it is sometimes difficult to 
justifY an estimate when actual costs are quite different. Using KYEstimate and making a 
new estimate in line with past experience is a conservative approach to conceptual 
estimating and provides justification based on past experience. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to 
either the K yTC or the Legislature. The reporting requirements of the oversight law, 
KRS45.245, impose additional work on the KyTC. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is 
required, are in some cases impossible to meet, and, in other cases, possible to meet only with 
additional staffing and/or by not performing current duties. 
The current oversight requirement has resulted in 362 overruns worth over $162 million being 
presented to the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation for review to date (7/1/92 -
7/1/96). All of these overruns have been approved. The UCT makes no concerted effort to 
track cost underruns. 
The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and causes a lot of wasted effort by K yTC 
personnel. It would be better to use different thresholds for different phases, or to allow 
updating estimates once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is available. 
An improvement to the current process would be to require that only overruns over a certain 
amount be formally presented to the IJCT and others require only a paper notification. The 
amount would be determined by a statistical analysis of overruns during the past few years. 
The conceptual estimating process can be improved by using actual costs of past projects to 
develop estimates for new projects. To do this requires that critical data be kept on all 
projects. KYEstimate can process historical data to allow estimators to use only those 
projects with like characteristics when preparing a new estimate. 
Estimates for right-of-way costs have not seen improvement with use of actual costs of past 
projects. The cost-per-parcel model and database that was being developed showed a high 
variation in unit cost and has been abandoned. 
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Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the K yTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them 
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating 
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to KyTC's cost forecasting ability and 
to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. To seize this opportunity, both the 
Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, and with the researcher, 
in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political and fiscal realities. 
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PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following preliminary recommendations are made, based on the findings of the first three 
years of this five-year study. 
• Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature. 
• Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be 
done with current resources. 
• Develop statewide and regional databases of highway costs. 
• Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization. 
• Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that a 
cause and effect relationship can be established. 
• Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use. 
• Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates. 
• Require an estimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on the 
Project Authorization Form (TC-1 0). 
• IJCT adapt the oversight implementation to better track performance and reduce the 
added burden on the KyTC. 
• Track project phase underruns of> 15% as well as overruns. 
• Limit formal reports of overruns to those that have a potential of being disapproved. 
• Instead of a flat> 15% limit, use different limits based on class of estimate. 
• Let projects be carried through Phase I design without the 15% limitation. 
A small group, representing both legislators and the K yTC, should work with the researcher 
to articulate details of a process that meets political and fiscal realities. This would facilitate 
the implementation of needed improvements and lead to better relations within state 
government. 
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PATH FORWARD 
Specific goals for year 4 are: 
• to refine the cost-per-mile database, KYEstimate, 
• to work with the KyTC to get project data recorded in a place and format that can be used 
to update the databases being developed, 
• to improve the size and quality of both the preconstruction and construction databases 
• to develop tools and standard estimating procedures for KyTC estimators, 
• to develop a plan and a program to train KyTC personnel on the new estimating tools and 
procedures, and 
• to maintain contact with officials within the K yTC and the Legislature in an effort to 
develop a cost forecasting strategy that will satisfy both parties and will benefit the citizens 
of Kentucky. 
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APPENDIX 
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Construction Type 
1 Planning phase, project planning studied p 
2 Design phase, design projects D 
3 Right-of-way phase, right-of-way projects R 
4 Construction phase u 
a. Grade, drain, and surfacing c 
b. Grade, drain G 
c. Surfacing on new route or reconstruction s 
d. Bridge construction B 
e. Roadside improvement I 
f Traffic Services T 
g. Services facilities F 
h. Resurfacing H 
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Work Type Classification 
10 
20 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
40 
50 
60 
60A 
60B 
60C 
60D 
60E 
60F 
60G 
60H 
60I 
60K 
60L 
71 
72 
New Route 
Relocation 
Reconstruction to Freeway 
Reconstruction with More Lanes 
Reconstruction to Wider Lanes 
Pavement Reconstruction with Alignment 
Improvements 
Pavement Reconstruction 
Major Widening 
Minor Widening 
Restoration and Rehabilitation 
Pavement Milling and Bituminous Overlay 
Replace Cross Drains 
Install Edge Drains 
Correct Embankment Slide/Slide Correction 
Spot Improvements/Patching 
Install Median Drains 
Replace Storm Sewer 
Culvert Replacement 
Break, Seat, and Place Bituminous Overlay, 
Install Pavement edge drains, remove/ 
replace/reset guardrail as necessary 
Off Ramps on Interstate 
Guardrail 
Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements 
and Portland Cement Concrete Pavement 
Restoration 
Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements 
and Bituminous Pavement Restoration 
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77 
78 
80 
81 
83 
lOOA 
IOOB 
lOOC 
lOOE 
lOOEA 
lOOF 
IOOG 
IOOJ 
lOOK 
lOOL 
lOOM 
lOON 
1000 
lOOP 
107 
109J 
Resurfacing with Portland Cement Concrete 
Pavement Restoration 
Resurfacing with Bituminous Pavement 
Restoration 
Bridge Replacement 
Bridge Rehabilitation 
Culvert 
Replace or Refurbish Signs 
Construct One Tum Lane 
Construct More Than One Tum Lane 
Reconstruct Intersection 
Construct Intersection 
Install Signs and Signals at Intersection 
Construct Flush Median 
Construct Sidewalk 
Improve Sight Distance 
Construct Access Road/Entrance 
Construct Welcome Center 
Construct Interchange Ramps 
Install Lighting 
Pavement Markers 
Environmental 
Fill Slip Corrections 
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Functional Class Codes 
1 Rural Principal Arterial - Interstate RPAI 
2 Rural Principal Arterial - Other RPAO 
6 Rural Minor Arterial - Other RMNA 
7 Rural Major Collector RMJC 
8 Rural Minor Collector RMIC 
9 Rural Local Road RLR 
11 Urban Principal Arterial - Interstate UPAI 
12 Urban Principal Arterial -Freeway/Expressway UPAFE 
14 Urban Other Principal Arterial UOPA 
16 Urban Minor Arterial UMNA 
17 Urban Collector uc 
19 Urban Local Street ULS 
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